In this episode of the IEA podcast, we dive into Wes Streeting's proposed NHS reforms, exploring whether league tables and performance metrics can truly improve healthcare efficiency.
Great conversation as always. Near the end you touch on the end-of-the-end-of-history and the return of ideological tension, and specifically Marxist ideas. Fair enough - but I'd be more interested in a conversation about what the rise of populism (both left and right but mainly right since that seems more vigorous currently) means from a free-market liberal perspective. Though often used by critics as synonymous with "charlatans" the phenomenon seems to me deeper, and also more plastic, starting with a loss of trust in current elites and/or the managerial technocracy, but leading ... well, where? Allegations from people like Nick Cohen that it's a one-way road to fascism seem to me ridiculous. On the other hand, some mooted measures under Trump, such as new trade tariffs a cap on credit card interest rates are anti-free-market, and perhaps communitarian(?) But then again, Javier Milei is also a populist, and governing like Liz Truss on steroids, and just possibly (whisper it) successfully.
So I'd like to know more about how the IEA sees this. Are you pro-populist or against, or only in favour if led by free-market liberals?
That's a good question, Nick – and perhaps one we can talk about in greater length on a future podcast. Briefly: I don't mind libertarianism being sold as an 'anti-elite' programme, and I think there is a lot to dislike about modern bureaucracies and the values they embody. That said, I've become less confident about this particular brand of 'fusion' over the years. In practice, it doesn't seem to deliver a 'freedom agenda' and if anything it opens the door to unsavoury and illiberal tendencies. I don't think that's inevitable – I don't know as much about Milei as I should, but obviously I want him to succeed and do not mind in the slightest if he does it in way that people see as 'populist'. I suppose my concern is just that when you wrap free market liberalism up in right-wing populism for electoral reasons, there's a good chance that 'the mask eats the face' and you end up with something that is actually more hostile to free market liberalism than the social democratic default option. (Important to stress that the IEA does not have corporate views so I am only speaking for myself here – not for the organisation or any of my colleagues.)
"[C]lassical liberals [...] will welcome the defeat of a radical woke agenda, but be dismayed by the rest. Trump’s protectionism, economic nationalism and attempts to control migration [...] are contrary to their instincts."
Steve's theory, for quite a while (certainly predating Trumpism as a political phenomenon), has been that politics has gone through a realignment. What he means by that is:
In politics, there's usually one dominant issue which determines who your allies and who your opponents are. He calls that the "alignment issue". From the 1970s to the early 2010s, that alignment issue was economics. You are either a Big Government or a Small Government kind of guy. Whichever it is, you will see other people on the same side of that divide as your allies, even if you disagree with them on lots of other things, and you will see people on the other side of that divide as your opponents, even if you agree with them on lots of other things.
In the 2010s, economics ceased to be the primarily alignment issue. It's now what you could broadly label "culture and identity". You're either a cosmopolitan or a nationalist, and that trumps [no pun intended] economics. I've reviewed his book on the subject here:
This is difficult territory for classical liberals. I suppose, if anything, we're closer to the cosmopolitan than the nationalist side of that divide, but more importantly, liberals don't want to promote a specific vision of "the good life" or "the good society". If somebody prefers a steak & ale pie with room-temperature cask ale to a beef carpaccio with a glass of Valpolicella Amarone - that's fine by me. The whole point of classical liberalism is live and let live. So we don't naturally fit into a political landscape where culture and identity is the primary alignment issue.
Great conversation as always. Near the end you touch on the end-of-the-end-of-history and the return of ideological tension, and specifically Marxist ideas. Fair enough - but I'd be more interested in a conversation about what the rise of populism (both left and right but mainly right since that seems more vigorous currently) means from a free-market liberal perspective. Though often used by critics as synonymous with "charlatans" the phenomenon seems to me deeper, and also more plastic, starting with a loss of trust in current elites and/or the managerial technocracy, but leading ... well, where? Allegations from people like Nick Cohen that it's a one-way road to fascism seem to me ridiculous. On the other hand, some mooted measures under Trump, such as new trade tariffs a cap on credit card interest rates are anti-free-market, and perhaps communitarian(?) But then again, Javier Milei is also a populist, and governing like Liz Truss on steroids, and just possibly (whisper it) successfully.
So I'd like to know more about how the IEA sees this. Are you pro-populist or against, or only in favour if led by free-market liberals?
That's a good question, Nick – and perhaps one we can talk about in greater length on a future podcast. Briefly: I don't mind libertarianism being sold as an 'anti-elite' programme, and I think there is a lot to dislike about modern bureaucracies and the values they embody. That said, I've become less confident about this particular brand of 'fusion' over the years. In practice, it doesn't seem to deliver a 'freedom agenda' and if anything it opens the door to unsavoury and illiberal tendencies. I don't think that's inevitable – I don't know as much about Milei as I should, but obviously I want him to succeed and do not mind in the slightest if he does it in way that people see as 'populist'. I suppose my concern is just that when you wrap free market liberalism up in right-wing populism for electoral reasons, there's a good chance that 'the mask eats the face' and you end up with something that is actually more hostile to free market liberalism than the social democratic default option. (Important to stress that the IEA does not have corporate views so I am only speaking for myself here – not for the organisation or any of my colleagues.)
To add to that: here's Steve Davies's take on Trumpism, which, he believes, is on the whole bad news for classical liberals.
https://iea.org.uk/how-trumpism-vs-progressivism-leaves-classical-liberals-isolated/
The key passage is:
"[C]lassical liberals [...] will welcome the defeat of a radical woke agenda, but be dismayed by the rest. Trump’s protectionism, economic nationalism and attempts to control migration [...] are contrary to their instincts."
Steve's theory, for quite a while (certainly predating Trumpism as a political phenomenon), has been that politics has gone through a realignment. What he means by that is:
In politics, there's usually one dominant issue which determines who your allies and who your opponents are. He calls that the "alignment issue". From the 1970s to the early 2010s, that alignment issue was economics. You are either a Big Government or a Small Government kind of guy. Whichever it is, you will see other people on the same side of that divide as your allies, even if you disagree with them on lots of other things, and you will see people on the other side of that divide as your opponents, even if you agree with them on lots of other things.
In the 2010s, economics ceased to be the primarily alignment issue. It's now what you could broadly label "culture and identity". You're either a cosmopolitan or a nationalist, and that trumps [no pun intended] economics. I've reviewed his book on the subject here:
https://iea.org.uk/book-review-the-economics-and-politics-of-brexit-the-realignment-of-british-public-life-by-stephen-davies-part-1/
This is difficult territory for classical liberals. I suppose, if anything, we're closer to the cosmopolitan than the nationalist side of that divide, but more importantly, liberals don't want to promote a specific vision of "the good life" or "the good society". If somebody prefers a steak & ale pie with room-temperature cask ale to a beef carpaccio with a glass of Valpolicella Amarone - that's fine by me. The whole point of classical liberalism is live and let live. So we don't naturally fit into a political landscape where culture and identity is the primary alignment issue.